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Abstract—In this paper, the problem of secret key agreement
in state-dependent multiple access channels with an eavesdropper
is studied. For this model, the channel state information is non-
causally available at the transmitters; furthermore, a legitimate
receiver observes a degraded version of the channel state in-
formation. The transmitters can partially cooperate with each
other using a conferencing link with a limited rate. In addition,
a backward public channel is assumed between the terminals.
The problem of secret key sharing consists of two rounds. In
the first round, the transmitters wish to share a common key
with the legitimate receiver. Lower and upper bounds on the
common key capacity are established. In a special case, the
capacity of the common key is obtained. In the second round,
the legitimate receiver agrees on two independent private keys
with the corresponding transmitters using the public channel.
Inner and outer bounds on the private key capacity region are
characterized. In a special case, the inner bound coincides with
the outer bound. We provide some examples to illustrate our
results.
Index Terms—Information theoretic security, multiple access
channel, state-dependent, secret key sharing, common and private
key capacity region.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication in a network is possible when legit-
imate users have access to some secret keys. In [1], Shannon
demonstrated that the perfect secrecy condition can be satisfied
if:
H(K) ≥ H(M),
where, H(K) and H(M) are the entropies of the message
and the key, respectively. Secret key generation in a network
requires the existence of common randomness between users.
A simple model for common randomness, in the informa-
tion theory context, is distributed correlated sources. This
model was first studied by Ahlswede and Csiszar [2], where
legitimate users utilize two correlated sources as common
randomness to share a secret key in a noiseless network that
must be concealed from an eavesdropper. In [3], new bounds
on the secret key capacity over a multiterminal network with
public channel were established by Gohari and Anantharam.
This work was partially supported by Iranian NSF under contract no.
88114/46− 2010.
In their model, there are M legitimate terminals and an
eavesdropper that have access to correlated sources. Only some
of the legitimate terminals can transmit over the channel. All
the legitimate terminals intend to agree on a common key that
must be kept secret from the eavesdropper. In a noisy channel,
common randomness can be obtained by implementing the
channel distribution. This model is useful when illegal users
have no access to the common randomness or a part of
it. But if the legitimate users do not have any advantages
compared to the illegal users, this common randomness is
not beneficial for secret key sharing any more. Maurer solved
this problem using a backward public channel in the wiretap
model [4]. The backward public channel is a noiseless channel
used by the receivers to transmit messages to the transmitters
where the messages can be observed by an eavesdropper. In
[2], Ahlswede and Csiszar showed that a forward noiseless
channel does not help to solve the problem. In addition to the
Maurer’s solution, the problem can be solved when correlated
sources are distributed between legitimate users in a noisy
network. This idea was recently developed by Khisti et al. in
the wiretap channel where the transmitter and the legitimate
receiver have access to correlated sources [5]. Salimi and
Skoglund, in another recent work, investigated the problem
of secret key agreement over generalized multiple access
channels using correlated sources [6]. In this channel, each of
transmitters intends to agree on a private key with a receiver.
Furthermore, when a forward public channel is available, the
secret key sharing problem was studied by Salimi et al. [7].
In their model, the transmitters intend to share private keys
over the generalized multiple access channel with the receiver
using the public channel. The authors established examples
to show that the forward public channel can improve the
secret key capacity. In addition, they showed that using the
forward public channel for key sharing is more effective than
compress and forward strategy which was proposed in [8]. In
state-dependent noisy networks, the Channel State Information
(CSI) can be used as common randomness when illegal users
have limited access to the CSI. In these networks, the CSI
may be available causally or non-causally at the legitimate
users. Khisti et al. studied the problem of secret key agreement
over 2-receiver broadcast channels with causal or non-causal
CSI where the transmitter upon observing the CSI generates a
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secret key and sends the required information over the channel
and the legitimate receiver estimates the secret key [9]-[11].
Cooperation can be effective for common key sharing in a
network where there are more than one transmitter. Conferenc-
ing is one of the schemes that can be utilized to provide coop-
eration. In most cases, a noiseless channel with a limited rate
is used to establish the conferencing scheme. In [12], Willems
used the conferencing scheme in a multiple access channel
where there is an interactive noiseless channel with a limited
rate between the transmitters. Upon receiving sequences from
the noiseless channel, each transmitter determines the channel
input as a function of its message and the observed sequences.
Main Contributions and Organization
Consider a multiterminal network with n + 1 users, where
one of them acts as a Trusted Center (TC) and others act
as End Nodes (ENs). In addition, there is an illegal user in
the network which wishes to eavesdrop. In this network, the
ENs try to establish a confidential connection with the TC.
Therefore, they first need to agree on some keys with the TC
to announce themselves as trusted users. For transmitting the
confidential message, the TC needs to generate n independent
private keys and share them with each of the ENs. These
private keys provide an ability of multiplexing in the network.
The eavesdropper tries to find the keys and attack the
network. Motivated by the above scenario, we define our
system model. As Fig. 1 illustrates, we consider a three-user
network with an eavesdropper, in which two ENs and a TC
are modeled as two transmitters and a legitimate receiver,
respectively. The transmitters and the legitimate receiver are
connected by a State-Dependent Multiple Access Channel
(SD-MAC) where a conferencing link is available between
the transmitters. In addition, the eavesdropper observes
the channel. An insecure backward public channel with an
unlimited capacity is available between all the terminals. In
order to achieve a secure connection; at first, the transmitters
intend to share a common key over the SD-MAC with the
legitimate receiver using the conferencing scheme. Then, the
legitimate receiver shares an independent private key with
each of the transmitters over the public channel.
In this model, we investigate the problem of secret key
agreement in two rounds. In the first round, we establish
the lower and upper bounds on the common key capacity.
The intuition behind the lower bound comes from the
superposition coding and random binning. The state is
utilized to generate the common key by means of the hybrid
joint source channel coding. In the second round, the inner
and outer bounds are derived on the private key capacity
region. The double random binning is used to satisfy the
secrecy constrains. In this round, the private key capacity is
obtained for some special cases. Different systems can be
modeled as the SD-MAC with an eavesdropper. For example,
we consider a binary memory with stuck at faults in which
two end nodes utilize this memory to share a common key
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Fig. 1. The state-dependent multiple access channel with an eavesdropper.
with a trusted center where an eavesdropper has access to the
memory. As another example, we discuss the key agreement
in the modulo-additive SD-MAC with an eavesdropper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the problem definition is described. In Section III, our main
results and the intuitions behind them are given. In Section
IV, examples are provided. Finally, proofs are presented in
Section V.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Throughout the paper, we denote a discrete random variable
with an upper case letter (e.g., X) and its realization by the
lower case letter (e.g., x). We denote the probability density
function of X over X with p(x) and the conditional probability
density function of Y given X by p(y|x). Finally, we use Y n
to indicate vector (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn).
A discrete memoryless SD-MAC with an eavesdropper is
defined by a channel input alphabet X1 ×X2, a channel state
alphabet S, a channel output alphabet Y , an eavesdropper’s
output alphabet Z and a transition probability function
p(y, z|x1, x2, s) where X1,X2,Y,Z and S are finite sets. As
Fig. 1 illustrates, the transmitters have access to the exact
CSI while the legitimate receiver has access to the degraded
version of the CSI non-causally.
We consider the interactive key agreement in the SD-
MAC with an eavesdropper where a backward public channel
with unlimited capacity is available from the receivers to the
transmitters. We assume that a noiseless channel, with limited
rate RC , is available between the encoders which can be
used for conferencing. The interactive key agreement scheme
consists of two rounds. In the first round, the transmitters
generate a common key using conferencing and transmit
required information for common key sharing to the legitimate
receiver via the SD-MAC. In the second round, the legitimate
receiver agrees on a private key with each transmitter using
the public channel. In the following we clarify the schemes
with details.
A. The First Round
In the first round, as Fig. 1 illustrates, the first transmitter,
upon observing sn, generates k01 ∈ [1 : 2nR0) as a common
key and sends the required information to the second trans-
mitter over the noiseless channel with limited rate RC . The
second transmitter generates k02 ∈ [1 : 2nR0), as a function
of received information and sn, to share with the legitimate
receiver. Then, the transmitters determine x1i and x2i for
i ∈ [1 : n], as deterministic functions of the corresponding
common keys and sn, and transmit xn1 and x
n
2 over the SD-
MAC with an eavesdropper. The legitimate receiver observes
the channel output yn and reconstructs the common key
kˆ0. The sequence zn is received from the SD-MAC by the
eavesdropper.
Definition 1: In the first round, a rate R0 is said to be
achievable if for every  > 0 and sufficiently large n, there
exists a protocol such that
Pr{K01 6= K02} <  (1)
Pr{∪2i=1{Kˆ0 6= K0i}} <  (2)
1
n
I(K0;Z
n) <  (3)
1
n
log | K0 |< 1
n
H(K0) +  (4)
1
n
H(K0) > R0 −  (5)
Equation (1) investigates conferencing achievement. Equation
(2) is the reliability condition of the common key. Equation (3)
implies that the eavesdropper has effectively no information
about the common key. Finally, the set of equations (4) and
(5) investigate the uniformity conditions.
Definition 2: The common key capacity is the set of all
achievable rates R0.
B. The Second Round
In the second round, as Fig. 1 illustrates, the legitimate
receiver, upon observing Y n and Tn, determines two inde-
pendent private keys k1 ∈ [1 : 2nR1) and k2 ∈ [1 : 2nR2) for
sharing with the first and second transmitter, respectively. The
legitimate receiver transmits ψ1 = ψ1(k1) and ψ2 = ψ2(k2)
over the backward public channel. For i = 1, 2, the ith trans-
mitter estimates its private key kˆi. The eavesdropper utilizes
zn, ψ1 and ψ2 for eavesdropping.
Definition 3: In the second round, a rate pair (R1, R2) is
an achievable private key rate pairs if for every  > 0 and
sufficiently large n there exists a protocol such that
Pr{Ki 6= Kˆi} <  (6)
1
n
I(Ki;Z
n, ψ1, ψ2) <  (7)
1
n
I(Ki;X
n
ic ,Kic , S
n, ψ1, ψ2) <  (8)
1
n
log | Ki |< 1
n
H(Ki) +  (9)
1
n
H(Ki) > Ri −  (10)
for i = 1, 2, where ic is i’s complement, i.e., {ic, i} = {1, 2}.
Equation (6) is the reliability conditions. Equations (7) and
(8) mean that the eavesdropper and each transmitter have
efficiently no information about the other transmitter’s private
key. Finally, the set of equations (9) and (10), investigate the
uniformity conditions.
Definition 4: The private key capacity region is the set of
all achievable rate pairs (R1, R2).
III. MAIN RESULTS
Here, we provide inner and outer bounds on the secret key
capacity region of the SD-MAC with an eavesdropper, in two
sub-sections. In sub-section III-A, we discuss the lower and
upper bounds on the common key capacity. The inner and
the outer bounds on the private capacity region are given in
sub-section III-B.
A. The First Round
In this sub-section, we present two theorems. Theorem 1
states a lower bound on the common key capacity.
Theorem 1 (Common Key Lower Bound): The common
key rate R0 is achievable for the first round if
R0 ≤ [I(V ;Y, T |U)− I(V ;Z|U)]+ (11)
subject to the constraints:
I(U ;Y |T ) ≤ I(U ;S) (12)
I(V ;Y, T |U) ≤ I(V ;S|U) (13)
RC ≥ H(U, V |S) (14)
for some input distribution:
p(s, t, u, v, x1, x2, y, z) = p(s)p(t|s)p(u|s)p(v|u, s)
p(x1|u, v, s)p(x2|u, v, s)p(y, z|x1, x2, s), (15)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}.
Outline of the Proof: The achievability follows by speci-
fying the sequence Un as a description of Sn. V n is generated
over Un using the superposition coding. The Un and V n are
shared between the transmitters by utilizing the conferencing
link. The random binning is applied to satisfy the secrecy
constrains. Upon observing Tn and Y n, the legitimate receiver
estimates the common key by means of joint typicality decod-
ing. The proof is provided in section V-A.
Theorem 2 states an upper bound on the common key
capacity.
Theorem 2 (Common Key Upper Bound): For the common
key sharing, any rate R0 must satisfy
R0 ≤ I(X1, X2, S;Y, T |Z) (16)
Proof : See Section V-B.
In the following, we establish the common key capacity for
a special case.
Corollary 1: If the random variables U, V, Y and Z form
the Markov chain, (U, V ) → Y → Z, i.e., the illegal output
Z is the degraded version of Y , the common key capacity
reduces to:
R0 ≤ I(V ;Y, T |U,Z) (17)
subject to the constraints:
I(U ;Y |T ) ≤ I(U ;S) (18)
I(V ;Y, T |U) ≤ I(V ;S|U) (19)
RC ≥ H(U, V |S) (20)
Proof : See section V-C.
B. The Second Round
Now, the bounds on the private key capacity region are
given. Theorem 3 states an inner bound on the private key
capacity region.
Theorem 3 (Private Key Inner Bound): The private key
rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable for the second round if
R1 ≤ [min{I(T1;X1, S|T )− I(T1;X2, S|T ),
I(T1;X1, S|T )− I(T1;Z)}]+ (21)
R2 ≤ [min{I(T2;X2, S|T )− I(T2;X1, S|T ),
I(T2;X2, S|T )− I(T2;Z)}]+ (22)
subject to the constraints:
I(T1;X1, S|T ) ≤ I(T1;Y |T ) (23)
I(T2;X2, S|T ) ≤ I(T2;Y |T ) (24)
for some input distribution:
p(s, t, t1, t2, x1, x2, y, z) = p(s)p(x1, x2|s)
p(y, z|x1, x2, s)p(t)p(t1|t)p(t2|t). (25)
Outline of the Proof: In order to achieve the inner bound,
two conditionally independent sequences Tn1 and T
n
2 are
generated with probability distribution p(t1|t)p(t2|t). Then,
we use the double random binning to satisfy the secrecy
constrains. The proof is given in section V-D.
Theorem 4 states an outer bound on the private key capacity
region.
Theorem 4 (Private Key Outer Bound): For the private key
sharing, any rate pair (R1, R2) must satisfy:
R1 ≤ min{I(T1;X1, S|Z), I(T1;X1|X2, S)} (26)
R2 ≤ min{I(T2;X2, S|Z), I(T2;X2|X1, S)} (27)
This bound can be directly deduced from Theorem 1 in [2].
In the following, we obtain the private key capacity region for
a special case.
Corollary 2: If the inputs and output of the SD-MAC with
an eavesdropper form a Markov chain as (X1, T1) → (S, T )
→ (X2, T2) → Z, the private key capacity region reduces to:
R1 ≤ I(T1;X1|S,X2) (28)
R2 ≤ I(T2;X2|S,X1) (29)
subject to the constraints:
I(T1;X1, S|T ) ≤ I(T1;Y |T ) (30)
I(T2;X2, S|T ) ≤ I(T2;Y |T ) (31)
Proof : The achievability follows from Theorem 3 where we
have:
R1 ≥ I(T1;X1, S|T )−max{I(T1;X2, S|T ), I(T1;Z)}
(a)
= I(T1;X1, S|T )− I(T1;X2, S|T ) = I(T1;X1|S, T )
− I(T1;X2|S, T ) = I(T1;X1, X2|S, T )
− I(T1;X2|X1, S, T )− I(T1;X2|S, T )
(b)
= I(T1;X2|S, T ) + I(T1;X1|X2, S, T )− I(T1;X2|S, T )
= I(T1;X1|X2, S, T ) (c)= I(T1;X1|X2, S), (32)
where (a), (b) and (c) can be deduced from the Markov chain,
(X1, T1) → S → T → (X2, T2) → Z. The proof of converse
can be obtained from the outer bound of Theorem 4.
IV. EXAMPLES
Different examples can be established to illustrate our
proposed model. In this section, we present some examples
to explain our results.
A. Binary Memory with Stuck at Faults
Consider a network where two ENs intend to share a
common key k0 ∈ [1 : 2nR0) with the TC. In this network,
a binary memory with stuck at faults is available where
the eavesdropper has access to this memory. Suppose only
the ENs have access to the defect information. For the
key agreement, the ENs utilize the fault pattern to share
the required information with the TC. The binary memory
with stuck at faults can be modeled as the state-dependent
memoryless channel where each of the memory cells sticks at
0 with a probability p2 , likewise, sticks at 1 with a probability
p
2 and behaves as a noiseless binary channel with a probability
1−p [13]. For the described example, the following argument
shows that a lower bound on the common key capacity is
R0 ≤ p bits subject to the constraint H(V |S) ≤ 1− p.
We propose a protocol for the common key agreement: Fix
distribution p(v, s) such that H(V |S) ≤ 1− p. Generate a set
of 2n binary sequences vn(mv), mv ∈ [1 : 2n) according to a
Bernoulli distribution with success probability 12 where there
are roughly 2n(1−p) sequences vn that match any given fault
pattern. Partition them into 2nR0 equal size subsets. Choose
the sequence vn such that vn and sn are jointly typical respect
to p(v, s). Set the subset index of chosen vn as the common
key. By using the above protocol and Theorem 1, we prove
R0 ≤ p.
Proof: By setting U = T = ∅ in Theorem 1, we have:
R0 ≤ I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z) = H(V |Z)−H(V |Y )
≤ H(V )−H(V |Y ) = 1− (1− p) = p bits
and for the constraint we have:
I(V ;Y ) ≤ I(V ;S)⇒ H(V |S) ≤ H(V |Y )
⇒ H(V |S) ≤ 1− p bits
In fact, the ENs utilize the fault pattern for common key
sharing with the TC. Therefore, the common key rate is
bounded by error probability p.
B. The Modulo-Additive SD-MAC
Consider the binary SD-MAC with channel output
Y = X1 ⊕X2 ⊕ S ⊕N1 and eavesdropper’s output Z = X1
⊕ X2 ⊕ S ⊕ N2 where N1 ∼ Bern(p1), N2 ∼ Bern(p2),
0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ 12 and the channel state S has a Bernoulli
distribution with success probability pS . In proposed model,
the transmitters intend to share a common key k0 ∈ [1 : 2nR0)
with the legitimate receiver Y using conferencing with limited
rate RC . A lower bound on the common key capacity of the
modulo-additive SD-MAC with eavesdropper is
R0 ≤ Hb((α ∗ pS) ∗ p1) +Hb(pS ∗ p2)
−Hb((α ∗ pS) ∗ p2)−Hb(pS ∗ p1)
subject to the constraint:
H(V |S) ≤ min{Hb(α) +Hb(α ∗ p1)−Hb((α ∗ pS) ∗ p1), RC}
Proof: In order to prove the lower bound, we set U = T = ∅
and X1 = X2 = V ∼ Bern(α), using the conferencing link,
in Theorem 1 such that
R0 ≤ I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z) = H(Y ) +H(Z|V )−H(Z)
−H(Y |V ) = H(V ⊕ S ⊕N1) +H(V ⊕ S ⊕N2|V )
−H(V ⊕ S ⊕N2)−H(V ⊕ S ⊕N2|V )
= H(V ⊕ S ⊕N1) +H(S ⊕N2)−H(V ⊕ S ⊕N2)
−H(S ⊕N2) = Hb((α ∗ pS) ∗ p1)
+Hb(pS ∗ p2)−Hb((α ∗ pS) ∗ p2)−Hb(pS ∗ p1)
for the constraint we have:
I(V ;Y ) ≤ I(V ;S)⇒ H(Y )−H(Y |V ) ≤ H(V )−H(V |S)
Hb((α ∗ pS) ∗ p1)−Hb(α ∗ p1) ≤ Hb(α)−H(V |S)
H(V |S) ≤ Hb(α) +Hb(α ∗ p1)−Hb((α ∗ pS) ∗ p1).
and
RC ≥ H(V |S)
where a ∗ b = a(1− b) + (1− a)b and Hb(x) = −x log(x)−
(1− x) log(1− x).
V. PROOFS
In this section, we present proofs of the main results. In
order to prove Theorem 1, we employ the superposition coding
[14] and random binning [15]. The intuition behind the proof
of Theorem 3 comes from the Slepian & Wolf coding [16] and
the double random binning. The proofs of the outer bounds
are similar to [2].
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Fix probability distribution p(xi, u, v|s) for i = 1, 2,
Codebook Generation: Randomly and independently gen-
erate 2nRU sequences Un(mu), mu ∈ [1 : 2nRU ) each ac-
cording to
∏n
i=1 p(ui). The set of all sequences U
n is repre-
sented by CU . For each Un(mu), randomly and conditionally
independently generate 2nR˜V , sequences V n(mv), mv ∈
[1 : 2nR˜V ), each according to
∏n
i=1 p(vi|ui) and randomly
partition them into 2nRV bins. Consequently, each bin con-
sists of 2n(R˜V −RV ) sequences V n in average. Codebook CU
contains of 2nRU sub-codebooks where sub-codebook mu is
represented by CV (mu).
Encoding: The first encoder, ENC 1, upon observing CSI
sn chooses a pair (mu,mv) such that,
(sn, un(mu), v
n(mv)) ∈ T (n) (S,U, V ). (33)
If there is no such pair, ENC 1 sets (mu,mv) = (1, 1).
If there are more than one pair, ENC 1 randomly chooses
mu and mv . Then, ENC 1 sends pair (mu,mv) over the
noiseless channel with limited rate RC . ENC 2 reconstructs
un(mu) and vn(mv), using the codebook. The reconstruction
can be done successfully if:
RC ≥ max
mu
{ 1
n
log(‖ A(U) ∩ CU ‖ × ‖ A(V ) ∩ CV (mu) ‖)}
(34)
the sets A(U) and A(V ) are defined as below:
A(U) = {un|∃ sn 3 (un, sn) ∈ T (n) (S,U)}
A(V ) = {vn|∃ sn, un 3 (vn, un, sn) ∈ T (n) (S,U, V )}.
where ‖ A(U) ∩ CU ‖ and ‖ A(V ) ∩ CV (mu) ‖ indicate the
number of sequences Un in CU and V n in CV (mu),mu ∈
[1 : 2nRU ) that are jointly typical with Sn, respectively. It can
be shown that condition (34) is satisfied by RC ≥ H(U, V |S).
Simply, we can consider RC = RU + R˜V .
ENC j transmits xji = xji(si, ui(mu), vi(mv)) for i ∈
[1 : n], j = 1, 2 over the SD-MAC. This can be done with an
arbitrarily small probability of error as n→∞ if:
RU ≥ I(U ;S) (35)
R˜V ≥ I(V ;S|U) (36)
The above conditions can be deduced from the covering lemma
[17].
Remark 1: According to the channel distribution, the output
distribution p(y) can be written as
p(y) =
∑
x1,x2,s
p(y|x1, x2)p(x1, x2, s).
In order to cover the probability space of variables X1, X2
and S completely, we must generate the codewords Xn1 and
Xn2 as functions of S
n.
Common Key Generation: The transmitters choose the bin
index of vn(mv) as the common key to share with the
legitimate receiver.
Decoding: The legitimate decoder, upon observing the chan-
nel output yn, estimates un(mˆu) such that
(yn, tn, un(mˆu)) ∈ T (n) (Y, T, U) (37)
and recovers vn(mˆv) ∈ CV (mˆu) such that
(yn, tn, un(mˆu), v
n(mˆv)) ∈ T (n) (Y, T, U, V ). (38)
If an error occurs, the legitimate decoder sets (mˆu, mˆv) =
(1, 1). By using the packing lemma and mutual packing lemma
[18], the probability of error tends to zero as n→∞ if:
RU ≤ I(U ;Y |T ) (39)
R˜V ≤ I(V ;Y, T |U) (40)
RU + R˜V ≤ I(U, V ;Y |T ) (41)
Secrecy Analysis: In order to check the security condition
on the common key rate averaged over the random codebook
assignments CV , we have:
I(K0;Z
n|CV ) ≤ I(K0;Zn, Un|CV ) = H(K0|CV )
−H(K0|Zn, Un, CV ) = H(K0|CV )−H(K0, V n|Zn, Un, CV )
+H(V n|K0, Zn, Un, CV ) = nRV −H(V n|Zn, Un, CV )
−H(K0|Zn, Un, V n, CV ) +H(V n|K0, Zn, Un, CV )
(a)
= nRV −H(V n|Zn, Un, CV ) +H(V n|K0, Zn, Un, CV )
(b)
≤ nRV − nR˜V + nI(V ;Z|U) + nR˜V − nRV
− nI(V ;Z|U) + n = n (42)
where (a) follows from the fact that K0 is the bin index of V n
and the equality H(K0|Zn, Un, V n, CV ) = 0 holds. (b) can
be deduced from inequalities H(V n|Zn, Un, CV ) ≤ nR˜V −
nI(V ;Z|U) + n and H(V n|K0, Zn, Un, CV ) ≤ nR˜V −
nRV−nI(V ;Z|U)+n if R0 ≤ I(V ;Y, T |U)−I(V ;Z|U)+,
the proof is similar to [18, Lemma 22.3].
B. Proof of Theorem 2
In our described model, the legitimate receiver should be
able to estimate the common key K0 correctly, therefore, ac-
cording to the Fano’s inequality we have 1nH(K0|Y n, Tn) ≤ 
and also, the security condition 1nI(K0;Z
n) ≤  must be
satisfied. We obtain an upper bound on R0,
nR0 = H(K0) = I(K0;Z
n) +H(K0|Zn)
(a)
≤ H(K0|Zn) + n = I(K0;Y n, Tn|Zn)
+H(K0|Y n, Tn, Zn) + n
(b)
≤ I(K0;Y n, Tn|Zn) + 2n
≤ I(K0, Xn1 , Xn2 , Sn;Y n, Tn|Zn) + 2n
(c)
= I(Xn1 , X
n
2 , S
n;Y n, Tn|Zn) + 2n
≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1i, X2i, Si;Yi, Ti|Zi) + 2n
(d)
= nI(X1Q, X2Q, SQ;YQ, TQ|ZQ, Q) + 2n
= nI(X1Q, X2Q, SQ;YQ, TQ|ZQ) + 2n (43)
where (a) deduces from the security condition, (b) follows
from the Fano’s inequality, (c) can be derived from the Markov
chain K0 → (Xn1 , Xn2 ) → (Y n, Zn). (d) can be obtained by
considering Q as a uniform variable over [1 : n].
C. Proof of Corollary 1
The achievability follows from Theorem 1 where we have:
R0 ≥ I(V ;Y, T |U)− I(V ;Z|U) = I(V ;Y, T, Z|U)
− I(V ;Z|U, Y, T )− I(V ;Z|U) (a)= I(V ;Z|U)
+ I(V ;Y, T |Z,U)− I(V ;Z|U) = I(V ;Y, T |Z,U) (44)
where (a) comes from the Markovity. For the converse proof,
we have:
nR0 = H(K0) = I(K0;Z
n) +H(K0|Zn)
(a)
≤ H(K0|Zn) + n = I(K0;Y n, Tn|Zn)
+H(K0|Y n, Tn, Zn) + n
(b)
≤ I(K0;Y n, Tn|Zn) + 2n
≤ I(K0, Xn1 , Xn2 , Sn;Y n, Tn|Zn) + 2n
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(K0, X
n
1 , X
n
2 , S
n;Yi, Ti|Zi, Y ni+1, Tni+1) + 2n
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(K0, X
n
1 , X
n
2 , Si;Yi, Ti|Zi, Y ni+1, Tni+1, Si−1)
+ 2n
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Vi;Yi, Ti|Zi, Ui) + 2n
(f)
= nI(VQ;YQ, TQ|ZQ, UQ, Q) + 2n
= nI(VQ;YQ, TQ|ZQ, UQ) + 2n (45)
where (a) follows from the security condition I(K0;Zn) ≤
n, (b) comes from the Fano’s inequality H(K0|Y n, Tn) ≤
n. (c) and (d) can be deduced from the Markov
chains, (K0, Xn1 , X
n
2 , S
n) → (Tni+1, Y ni+1) → Zni+1 and
(K0, X
n
1 , X
n
2 ) → Si−1 → Zi−1, respectively. By defining
Vi = (K0, X
n
1 , X
n
2 , Si) and Ui = (Y
n
i+1, T
n
i+1, S
i−1), (e) is
obtained. (f) can be established by considering Q as a uniform
variable over [1 : n].
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Fix probability distribution p(t1, t2, t) = p(t)p(t1|t)p(t2|t)
Codebook Generation: For i = 1, 2, randomly generate
2nRTi sequences Tni (mti), mti ∈ [1 : 2nRTi ) each according
to
∏n
j=1 p(tij |t) and partition them into 2nR
′
Ti bins and 2nR
′′
Ti
sub-bins using the double random binning. Therefore, there are
2n(RTi−R
′
Ti
) sequences Tni in each bin and 2
n(RTi−R′Ti−R
′′
Ti
)
sequences Tni in each sub-bin in average. CTi indicates the
coodebook containing all Tni . The bin m
′
ti and sub-bin m
′′
ti
are represented by B′(m′ti) and B′′(m′′ti), respectively.
Private Key Generation: For i = 1, 2, the legitimate re-
ceiver, Y , upon observing the channel output yn, chooses
tni (mti) such that
(tni (mti), y
n) ∈ T (n) (Ti, Y ) (46)
and sets m′′ti , t
n
i (mti) ∈ B′′(m′′ti), as private key ki to share
with the ith transmitter. This can be done with an arbitrarily
small probability of error if:
RTi ≥ I(Ti;Y |T ). (47)
The above conditions can be deduced directly from the cov-
ering lemma.
Use of Public Channel: The legitimate receiver, Y , transmits
m′ti , t
n
i (mti) ∈ B′(m′ti) for i = 1, 2 over the backward public
channel.
Key Reconstruction: The ith transmitter, upon receiving m′ti ,
estimates mˆti such that
tni (mˆti) ∈ B′(m′ti), (48)
(xni , s
n, tni (mˆti)) ∈ T (n) (Xi, S, Ti), (49)
and finds ki such that tni (mˆti) ∈ B′′(ki).
This can be done with an arbitrarily small probability of error
if:
RTi −R′Ti ≤ I(Xi, S;Ti|T ) for i = 1, 2. (50)
The above conditions can be deduced directly from the pack-
ing lemma.
Secrecy Analysis: In order to check the security condition
on the private key rate R1 averaged over the random codebook
assignments CT1 , we have:
I(K1;Z
n, ψ1, ψ2|CT1) = H(K1|CT1)−H(K1|Zn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
= H(K1|CT1)−H(K1, Tn1 |Zn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
+H(Tn1 |K1, Zn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1) = nR′′T1
−H(Tn1 |Zn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)−H(K1|Zn, Tn1 , ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
+H(Tn1 |K1, Zn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
(a)
= nR′′T1
+H(Tn1 |K1, Zn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)−H(Tn1 |Zn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
(b)
≤ nR′′T1 − nRT1 + nR′T1 + nI(T1;Z)
+ nRT1 − nR′T1 − nR′′T1 − nI(T1;Z) + n = n (51)
where (a) follows from the fact that K1 is the sub-bin index
of Tn1 and the equality H(K1|Zn, Tn1 , ψ1, ψ2, CT1) = 0
holds. (b) can be obtained from the inequalities
H(Tn1 |Zn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1) ≤ nRT1 − nR′T1 − nI(T1;Z) + n
and H(Tn1 |K1, Zn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1) ≤ nRT1 − nR′T1 − nR′′T1 −
nI(T1;Z) + n if R1 ≤ I(T1;X1, S|T ) − I(T1;Z) + , the
proof is similar to [18, Lemma 22.3]. And,
I(K1;K2, X
n
2 , S
n, ψ1, ψ2|CT1)
≤ I(K1;K2, Xn2 , Sn, Tn, ψ1, ψ2|CT1)
= H(K1|CT1)−H(K1|K2, Xn2 , Sn, Tn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
= H(K1|CT1)−H(K1, Tn1 |K2, Xn2 , Sn, Tn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
+H(Tn1 |K1,K2, Xn2 , Sn, Tn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
= nR′′T1 −H(Tn1 |K2, Xn2 , Sn, Tn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
−H(K1|K2, Xn2 , Sn, Tn, Tn1 , ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
+H(Tn1 |K1,K2, Xn2 , Sn, Tn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
=(a) nR′′T1 −H(Tn1 |K2, Xn2 , Sn, Tn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
+H(Tn1 |K1,K2, Xn2 , Sn, Tn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
≤(b) nR′′T1 − nRT1 + nR′T1 + nI(T1;X2, S|T )
+ nRT1 − nR′T1 − nR′′T1 − nI(T1;X2, S|T ) + n = n
(52)
where (a) follows from the fact that K1 is the sub-bin index of
Tn1 and the equality H(K1|K2, Xn2 , Sn, Tn, Tn1 , ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
= 0 holds. (b) can be deduced from the inequalities
H(Tn1 |K2, Xn2 , Sn, Tn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1) ≤ nRT1−nR′T1−nI(T1
;X2, S|T ) + n and H(Tn1 |K1,K2, Xn2 , Sn, Tn, ψ1, ψ2, CT1)
≤ nRT1 − nR′T1 − nR′′T1 − nI(T1;X2, S|T ) + n if R1 ≤
I(T1;X1, S|T ) − I(T1;X2, S|T ) + , the proof is similar to
[18, Lemma 22.3]. Finally, we have:
R1 ≤ min{I(T1;X1, S|T )− I(T1;X2, S|T ),
I(T1;X1, S|T )− I(T1;Z)}
Similarly, we can check the security conditions for K2.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the problem of interactive se-
cret key sharing over a state-dependent multiple access channel
with an eavesdropper. In our proposed model, the transmitters
share a common key with the receiver over multiple access
channel in the first round. The conferencing scheme has a
beneficial role in the common key sharing. In the second
round, the receiver agrees on two independent private keys
with the corresponding transmitters using the public channel.
The inner and outer bounds on the capacity region have been
established for the common and the private keys capacity
region.
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